In the consensus mechanism known as delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS), token holders are actively engaged in regular on-chain voting to determine which of the many competing groups will become the network’s 21 leading block producers. These leaders are tasked with generating the blocks that form the backbone of the EOS blockchain. EOS In alignment with the EOS Constitution, these influential block producers are not only responsible for running the project’s network but also offer development and community services to nurture the EOS ecosystem, enhancing their credentials to be elected as a prominent block producer.
Like other emerging blockchain projects, EOS's setup has both upsides and downsides. A major concern often mentioned is the potential for block producers to act dishonestly or collude. When these actions are hidden, it is challenging for the EOS community to address them.
On the other hand, if block producer misconduct happens openly, the community can use voting to penalize those at fault. This was demonstrated recently when EOS New York shared data on Twitter pointing out that another block producer was violating the EOS Constitution.
On the 27th of November, EOS New York unleashed a series of tweets focusing on domain registrations related to six EOS block producer endeavors.
“This Is Unacceptable”
They provided a snapshot of these registrations, asserting that a single party was behind these six block producers, showcasing that all their domains were registered simultaneously—on November 20, 2019, at 10:34—using the identical email, [email protected], which was at least associated in name with the EOS Shenzhen block producer group.
Following this discovery, EOS New York appealed to the community for support in addressing the misconduct, stating that they had initiated a petition targeting major block producers.
\"Six EOS producers are controlled by one entity, which is not acceptable. We've sought signatures from the top 50 producers to inform all token-holders of those who oppose or support this misconduct.\"
Thus, we are advocating for the removal of these producers: stargalaxybp, validatoreos, eoszeusiobp1, eosunioniobp, eosathenabp1, and eosrainbowbp.
The wrongdoing highlighted by EOS New York appears to flagrantly violate Article IV of the EOS Constitution, which includes the 'No Vote Buying' provision that states:
— Kevin Rose (@kroseranger) November 27, 2019
'No member shall offer or accept any consideration for any vote of any type, nor shall any member improperly sway the vote of another.'
The focus here is on the improper swaying of another block producer's vote, which is exactly what secretly managing six block producers entails. These managed producers operate without the autonomy guaranteed to them by their constitutional framework since they function as extensions of another producer.
Moreover, a sole entity that controls several block producers can skew the network's voting capacity unfairly, especially when it comes to altering the EOS Constitution itself, as per Article XI outlined in the document.
Remarkably, it seems the EOS community has already reacted decisively, as by the time of this report, EOS Shenzhen had lost over 348,000 votes in the ongoing BP voting cycle.
Taking a broader view, issues around unreliable block producers have plagued EOS since at least the previous autumn, when the EOSONE group disclosed instances of Chinese block producers trading votes and generally colluding.
Ethereum innovator offered his insights, suggesting on Twitter that EOS stakeholders might explore adopting sharding technology so that shared infrastructure between two validators wouldn't yield significant benefits, addressing the issues raised by EOS New York.
Vitalik Buterin Suggests Sharding
Truth be told, I believe EOS should leverage sharding and allocate each block producer to a random shard, ensuring that the sharing of infrastructure among two validators does not result in notable advantages, as they'd handle different data sets. This would boost their transactions per second (TPS) too.
Besides enhancing security, introducing sharding in this manner could significantly augment EOS's transaction processing capabilities. Yet, it's ultimately up to the EOS community to deliberate on potential benefits and drawbacks of safeguarding their network against similar faults. https://t.co/pmmXJSbjUK
— vitalik.eth (@VitalikButerin) November 28, 2019
William M. Peaster is a seasoned writer and editor with expertise in Ethereum, Dai, and Bitcoin narratives within the cryptoeconomy. His work has been featured in publications like Blockonomi, Binance Academy, and Bitsonline. He is passionate about following advancements in smart contracts, DAOs, dApps, and the Lightning Network. He is also diving into Solidity. Reach out to him on Telegram at @wmpeaster.
